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ADOPTEES' RIGHT TO SHARE IN TESTAMENTARY
GIFTS AS "CHILDREN"
W HERE A WILL CONTAINS A GIFT to the "children" of a named per-
son, a question of construction arises with regard to the right of an
adopted child to participate in the distribution.' Where recognized,
this right has been upheld on either or both of two grounds: (a) that
the testator intended that he share in the gift,2 or (b) that adoption
legally vested him with the status of a natural child.3  Accordingly,
where such intent is not readily inferable, the issue generally turns on
the court's interpretation of the applicable adoption statute.4
'See generally 3 PACE, WILLS § 1023 ( 3 d ed. 1941 ) 5 3 POWELL, REAL PROPERTY
§ 357 (195z) 5 Oler, Construction of Private Instruments Where Adopted Children Are
Concerned, 43 MICH. L. REV. 705, 711 et. seq. (1945); and Notes, 70 A.L.R. 6zx
(0931), 144 A.L.R. 670 (1943).
' Fundamental to the law of wills is the proposition that the intent of the testator
governs the distribution of his estate, unless contrary to law or public policy. ATKIN-
SON, WILLS § 146 (2d ed. 1953); 2 PAGE, WILLS, § 919 ( 3 d ed. 1941). Where his
intent can be ascertained from the language of the will itself, the will is controlling
and no evidence is admissible in court to contradict or vary its terms. Fuller v. Nazal,
259 Ala. 598, 67 So.2d 8o6 (1953)5 Lytle v. Guilliams, 241 Iowa 523, 41 N.W.zd
668 (1951)5 Dennis v. Omaha Nat'l Bank, 153 Neb. 865, 46 N.W.2d 6o6 (95 1)S
Cannon v. Cannon, 225 N.C. 61:, 36 S.E.2d 17 (x945)5 Industrial Trust Co. v.
Davies, 74 R.I. 36, 58 A.2d 399 (1948). Where the will contains a latent ambiguity,
however, as to the property devised or the object of the testator's bounty, it is neces-
sary for the court construing the will to place itself as nearly as possible in the position
of the testator at the time he executed the will in order to determine his probable
intent from a survey of the facts and circumstances which then existed and were
known to him. Butts v. Trust Co. of Georgia, 2o9 Ga. 787, 75 S.E.zd 745 (1953)
Davidson v. Davidson, 2 Ill.2d 197, 117 N.E.zd 769 (954)5 Marks v. Thomas, 238
N.C. 544, 78 S.E.2d 340 (1953) ; Noble v. Noble, 205 Okla. 91, 235 P.2d 670
(1951). 2 PAGE, WILLS § 920 ( 3d ed. 1941). A testator is presumed to know the law
in effect at the time the will was executed, and to have drawn the instrument in con-
templation thereof. Cleveland Clinic Foundation v. Humphrys, 97 F.zd 849 (6th
Cir. 1938); In re Heard's Estate, 107 Cal.App.2d 225, 236 P.zd 81o (1951), Bar-
field v. Aiken, 2o9 Ga. 483, 74 S.E.zd ioo (1953); Nelligan v. Long, 320 Mass. 439,
70 N.E.2d 175 (946); Leeper v. Leeper, 347 Mo. 442, 147 S.W.2d 667 (1941);
In re Tousey's Will, 260 Wis. 1SO, 50 N.W.2d 454 (95) 2 PACE, WILLS § 925 ( 3d
ed. 1941).
3 See, e.g., In re Holden's Trust, 207 Minn. 211, z9 N.W. 104 (1940); Haver v.
Herder, 96 N.J. Eq. 554, 126 Ad. 661 (1924); In re Upjohn's Will, 304 N.Y. 366,
107 N.E.2d 492 (1952).
'Adoption is purely statutory. In re Palmer, 129 Fla. 630, 176 So. 537 (937)
In re Jaren's Adoption, 223 Minn. 561, 27 N.W.2d 656 (1947); Eggleston v.
Landrum, 2io Miss. 645, 50 So.2d 364 (1951); Betz v. Horr, 276 N.Y. 83, 11
This is the problem which recently confronted the Supreme Court
of North Carolina in Bradford v. Johnson.' There, the testator had
devised his property in separate trusts for the benefit of his twelve
nephews and nieces during their lives. The will further provided that
when a nephew or niece should die, the trust for his benefit should ter-
minate and the corpus be divided per capita among the "children" of all
the nephews and nieces. One of the nephews having died, the executor
brought an action for a declaratory judgment to determine both the
rights of a child adopted by another nephew fourteen years prior to
the death of the testator and the rights of any child who might later
be adopted by any of the nephews and nieces.6 The lower court held
that, in both instances, the child would be entitled to share in the
distribution of trust corpus. The supreme court, however, observed
that the proper test of the adoptees' rights here was the intent of the
testator-and that the adoption statute was irrelevant as it purported
only to establish the right of adopted children to inherit through and
from their adoptive parents.7 Accordingly, it reversed as to any child
adopted after the testator's death, holding that the testator could not
have contemplated that such a person should take; but it affirmed as to
the child adopted before the testator's death, recognizing a presumption
in his favor since the testator knew of his adoption in time to exclude
him from the will but did not do so.
Early adoption statutes, with some exceptions,8 purported to estab-
N.E.2d 548 (1937); Wilson v. Anderson, 232 N.C. 212, 59 S.E.zd 836 (1950)5
In re Frazier, x8o Ore. 232, 177 P.2d 254 (1947). Since a testator is presumed to
know the law, an argument can be made that the adoption statute controls the meaning
of the word "child" as ambiguously used in the will. See text at notd z6 infra. The
effect of the statute on a will is a matter for court interpretation. See Oler, op. cit.
supra note x, at 715 et. seq.
'237 N.C. 572, 75 S.E.zd 632 (-953).
'3The right of a child adopted by a grandniece to take her share by representation
was also in issue. As to this child the question was decided in the negative, as the will
provided that the "issue" of any deceased parent should represent that parent per stirpes.
Id. at 581, 75 S.E.2d at 638. The question of whether adopted children are "issue"
is outside the scope of this Note.
7237 N.C. 572, 578, 75 S.E.2d 632, 636 (1953). See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 48-23
(Supp. 1953): "The final order [of adoption] forthwith shall establish the relationship
of parent and child between the petitioners and the child, and, from the date of the
signing of the final order of adoption, the child shall be entitled to inherit real and
personal property from the adoptive parents in accordance with the statutes of descent
and distribution [N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 29-149 (1o), z9-1(14) (1950)]2'
8E.g., AerS AND RESOLVES OF MASS. c. 310 (1871), first enacted in iSx5, stated
that an adopted child was the equivalent of a natural legitimate child in all instances
except two which are not relevant here. ACmS AND RESOLVES OF MASS. C. 213, § 9
(1876), however, limited the effect of adoption by allowing the adoptee to take if the
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lish the parent-child relationship only as between the parties to the
adoption. These statutes gave an adopted child the right of inheritance
from his adoptive parents alone and were construed not to accord him
the right of inheritance from their ancestors.10 By the same token, he
was held not to have been conferred with the right to take as a "child"
of his adoptive parents under the wills of other persons." Later re-
visions of the adoption statutes in some jurisdictions, however, have
tended to liberalize the effect of adoption and do away with the vestigial
distinctions between adopted and natural children.' 2 Thus, many stat-
utes now proclaim that adopted children are to be deemed natural,
legitimate children "for all legal consequences,"' 3 "for every pur-
pose,' 14 or "for all intents and purposes."' Others are more specific
and expressly include as an incident of adoption the right to share as
"children" under class gifts in wills.10
The prevailing view seems to be that an adoption statute can have
no effect on the construction of a will.' 7 Instead, a subjective intent has
testator was the adoptive parent, but established a presumption against the adoptee where
the testator was not his parent. Tirrell v. Bacon, 3 Fed. 62 (C.C. Mass. M88o).
9E.g., CAL. CIv. CODE § 228 (Deering 1949); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 6869 (1949);
D.C. CODE § x6-o05 (1940); IND. STAT. ANN. § 3-121 (Burns Replacement 1946);
ME. REV. STAT. c. 145, § 38 (I944); MICH CoMP. L. § 27.3178 (1948) ; N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 48-23 (Supp. 1953) i W.VA. CODE § 4759 (Michie 1949). See generally Oler,
op. cit. supra note i, at 715 et. seq.
1'In re Stewart's Estate, 30 Cal.App. 594, 86 P.zd 1071 (1939); Brun-
ton v. Internat'l Trust Co., 114 Colo. 298, 164 P.zd 472 (945) ; Woods v. Crump,
283 Ky. 675, 142 S.W.2d 68o (1940); Allen v. Nickerson, 293 Mass. 136, 199 N.E.
482 (1936)5 Crawford v. Arends, 351 Mo. ioo, 176 S.W.zd I(1943); I1t re
Hodges' Will, 294 N.Y. 58, 6o N.E.zd 540 (i945); Grimes v. Grimes, 207 N.C.
778, 178 S.E. ;73 (1935).
"In general, there is a presumption that the testator intended that his own adoptees
take as "children," but not children adopted by others. See Brunton v. Inter-
nat'l Trust Co., 114 Colo. 298, 164 P.zd 472 (945); Brookins v. Citizens & South-
ern Nat'l Bank, 205 Ga. 1z8, 52 S.E.2d 461 (1949); McLeod v. Andrews, 303 Ky. 46,
196 S.W.2d 473 (946); In re Chapple's Estate, 338 Mich. 246, 61 N.W.zd 37
(953)5 In re Yates' Estate, z8s Pa. 178, 1z6 AtI. 254 (1924).
12 See, e.g., 1z DEL. CODE ANN. §§ 919-20 (1953); IOWA CODE ANN. § 6oo.6
(1950); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 259.07 (947); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9: 3-9 (1953).
13Ky. REV. STAT. § 199.530(2) (953); N.D. REv. CODE § 14-1113 (1943).
:"Mo. STAT. ANN. § 453.090 (Vernon 1952), TEx. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 46(a),
§ 9 (Vernon i947).
"ALA. CODE tit. 27, § 5 (1940); COLO. REV. STAT. c. 4, § 1 (953); OHIo REV.
CODE § 3107.13 (954); R.I. GEN. LAWs ANN. c. 420, § 6 (1938); Wis. STAT. §
322.07 (947).
"'GA.CODEANN.§ 7 4 - 4 14 (Supp. 195;) ILL. REV. STAT. c. 4, art. 4, § 1 (1951);
MD. CODE ANN. art. i6, § 86 (Flack i95i); N.Y. Dom. REL. LAW § i15 (1954) J
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 18o.14 (Purdon 195o).
"7Noreen v. Sparks, 103 F. Supp. 588 (D.D.C. 1952), Russell v. Russell, 84 Ala.
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been "found," or ascribed to the testator, by the court, without refer-
ence to the statute, and this has commonly been presumed to have been
that the testator did not regard children adopted by others as their
"children" for this purpose.18  It would appear, however; that courts
can confidently adhere to this view only in those jurisdictions whose
adoption statutes do not clearly purport to elevate adopted children
in all respects to the status of natural children' -- and their number
is fast dwindling. Eleven such states have recently revised their adop-
tion statutes so as to equate the legal status of the adopted child more
closely with that of the natural child;2° and while these revisions
have, thus far, been held only to have no retroactive effect,2 there have
been indications that courts will effectuate their underlying policy in
resolving ambiguities in future wills.22
Even absent these liberalizing revisions, however, courts in sev-
eral other states have taken the view that, since the testator is presumed
to have known the law, the adoption statute in effect at the time the will
48, 3 So. 900 (1888); In re Pierce's Estate, 32 Cal.zd 265, 196 P.zd 1 (1948) ;
Brunton v. Internat'l Trust Co., 114 Colo. 298, 164 P.zd 472 (z945); Brookins v.
Citizens & Southern Nat'l Bank, zo5 Ga. 128, 52 S.E.zd 461 (1949); Blackford v.
Barnhill, rx 9 Ind.App. 257, 84 N.E.zd 64 (1949) ; Mesecher v. Lier, 241 Iowa 818,
43 N.W.zd 149 (195o); Savells v. Brown's Guardian, 187 Ky. 134, 718 S.W. 46z
(192o) i In re Woodcock, 103 Me. 214, 68 Atl. 8z (1907); Eureka Life Ins. Co. v.
Geis, 1z Md. 196, 88 Ati. 158 (1913) In re Chapple's Estate, 338 Mich. 246, 61
N.W.2d 37 (x953); Melek v. Curators of Univ. of Missouri, 223 Mo.AIp 572, 250
S.W. 614 (1923) 5 In re Yates' Estate, z8, Pa. 178, 1z6 Ati. 254 (1924); Rhode Is-
land Hospital Trust Co. v. Sack, 79 R.I. 493, 90 A.2d 436 (1952); Harle v. Harle,
1o9 Tex. 214, 204 S.W. 317 (igiS); Lichter v. Thiers, 139 Wis. 481, iz2 N.W.
153 (1909).
a See cases cited note i i supra.
10 No case has been found in which a court adhered to this view in the face of a
liberal adoption statute.
" Kentucky has the "for all legal consequences" statute (note 13 supra). Alabama,
Colorado, Rhode Island, and Wisconsin have the "all intents and purposes" type (note
15 supra). Missouri and Texas have the "for every purpose" type (note 14 supra).
Georgia, Maryland, and Pennsylvania statutes contain the express recognition of the
right to take under a will as a "child" (note 16 supra). Iowa Code Ann. § 6oo.6
(1946), states that "upon the entering of [final adoption] decree, the rights, duties,
and relationships between the child and parents by adoption shall be the same that
exist between parents and child by lawful birth. . ....
2' Copeland v. State Bank, 300 Ky. 432, 188 S.W.zd 1017 (1945); Gutman v.
Safe Deposit & Trust Co. of Baltimore, 198 Md. 39, 81 A.2d 207 (1951) ; In re Corr's
Estate, 338 Pa. 337, iz A.zd 76 (1940).
.2Barflield v. Aiken, 2o9 Ga. 483, 74 S.E.2d oo (i953) (reiterating presumption
that testator intends his property to go where law carries it) ; Leeper v. Leeper, 347
Mo. 456, 147 S.W.2d 667 (1941) ("children" defined by statute in force at time in-
strument was executed) ; cf. Russell v. Russell, 84 Ala. 48, 3 So. 900 (x888) (narrow
statute in force determined whether adoptee was a "child").
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was executed is a circumstance bearing on his intent, although of no
greater significance than any other circumstance 2 3 The fact that the
testator was a stranger to the adoption or that it occurred after his
death, however, has generally been held to negate any inferences of in-
tent which may arise from the statute.24
A few other jurisdictions, on the other hand, have now taken the
view that where the statute is broad enough to give adopted children
the full legal status of natural children," it controls in the absence of a
clear indication of contrary intent by the testator.2" This view, which
creates a presumption that the testator intended that children adopted
by others should be regarded as "children" for this purpose, is exactly
antithetical to the traditional view.27 Paradoxically, however, despite a
strong case to the contrary, 8 this rule has generally been held inappli-
cable where the testator did not know of the adoption or where it oc-
curred after his death.29
The decision in the Bradford case as to any child adopted after the
testator's death would therefore seem to be in accord with current
authority;3" the decision as to the child adopted within the testator's
lifetime, however, is quite advanced and liberal and represents at least
23Morgan v. Keefe, 135 Conn. 254, 63 A.zd 148 (1948)5 Wheeling Dollar Sav-
ing and Trust Co. v. Stewart, 178 W.Va. 703, 37 S.E.2d 563 (1946). This view is
also adhered to in several jurisdictions which have more liberal statutes. See, e.g.,
Hall v. Crandall, 25 Del.Ch. 339, 2o A.2d 545 (1941); Munie v. Gruenewald, 289
Ill. 468, 124 N.E. 6o5 (191) ; Third Nat'l Bank v. Davidson, 157 Ohio St. 355,
1o5 N.E.2d 573 (952).
"'See, e.g., Belfield v. Findlay, 389 I1. 526, 6o N.E.zd 403 (1945) and cases
cited in note 23 supra.
"See notes 12-16 supra and accompanying text.
2In re Holden's Trust, 207 Minn. 211, 291 N.W. 1o4 (194o); Haver v.
Herder, 96 N.J. Eq. 554, iz6 Atl. 661 (1924); In re Fisler's Estate, I31 N.J. Eq.
310, 25 A.2d 265 (1942)5 In re Upjohn's Will, 304 N.Y. 366, 107 N.E.2d 492
(1952). Accord, Leeper v. Leeper, 347 Mo. 456, 147 S.W.2d 667 (1941); Hoellinger
v. Molzhon, 77 N.D. xo8, 41 N.W.2d 217 (1950).
" I.e., that the statute has no effect on the construction of the will and that the
testator is presumed not to intend children adopted by others to take as their "children."'
See note i i supra and accompanying text.
" See In re Holden's Trust, 207 Minn. 211, 291 N.W. 1o4 (1940).
" See In re Fisler's Estate, 131 N.J. Eq. 310, 25 A.2d 265 (1942); Ahlemeyer v.
Miller, ioz N.J.L. 54, 131 Atl. 54 (1925); In re Hall's Will, 127 N.Y.S.2d 445
(19s4).
3°See, e.g., Comer v. Comer, 195 Ga. 79, 23 S.E.zd 420 (1942); Belfield v.
Findlay, 389 Ill. 526, 6o N.E.2d 403 (945); Sanders v. Adams, 278 Ky. 24, 128
S.W.2d 223 (1939); In re Corr's Estate, 338 Pa. 337, 12 A.zd 76 (1940) ; Cochran
v. Cochran, 43 Tex. Civ. App. 259, 95 S.W. 731 (29o6); and cases cited in notes
23 and 29 supra.
a partial abandonment of the long-held traditional position."- The sig-
nificance of this shift is heightened by the fact that North Carolina has
followed the recent liberal trend to a point beyond that reached by
other states under their more modern statutes"2 although its statute was
expressly held by the court to be too limited to conduce to this end.
However, where the testator either did not know of the adoption or did
not have time in which to change his will, the implication seems to be
that no presumption of testamentary intent will be created in favor of
an adopted child 33 Accordingly, in order to protect the advance made
by the Bradford decision and further extend it, it would appear to be
desirable to enact legislation which would unequivocally define the
rights of adopted children under testamentary dispositions.34
JOHN D. JOHNSTON, JR.
"In Smyth v. McKissick, 222 N.C. 644, 24 S.E.2d 62i (19z2), the court held,
on substantially similar facts, that the evidence adduced on behalf of the adopted child
(i.e., that the testator knew and approved of the adoption and treated the natural and
adopted children alike) was sufficient to overcome the presumption against him and to
establish an intent on the part of the testator that he should take. The Bradford case,
on the other hand, holds that the presumption is in favor of the adopted child.
". The Bradford decision is the only one to recognize such a presumption in the face
of a narrow statute (see cases cited in note 17 supra). The rule is also more liberal
than that laid down in the cases holding that a broad statute is only a circumstance
(see note 23 supra).
"In Wachovia Bank v. Green, 239 N.C. 612, 8o S.E.2d 771 (1954), where the
children were adopted after the testator's death, the court held that the Bradford rule
did not apply and found in the will an intent to exclude adopted children.
"It is understood that legislation equating the status of natural and adopted chil-
dren to the extent of including the right to take as "children" under class gifts of wills
is now before the North Carolina General Statutes Commission.
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